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NONPROFIT ASSOCIATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO ANTITRUST LIABILITY
FOR THE ACTS OF THEIR AGENTS WITH APPARENT
AUTHORITY
American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.,
102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982)
In American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp. ,t
the United States Supreme Court broadened the reach of the antitrust
laws by applying the agency law doctrine of apparent authority2 to
hold a nonprofit association liable under the Sherman Act3 for the un-
authorized anticompetitive acts of its members.4
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) is a volun-
tary membership association that promulgates codes and standards for
the engineering industry.5 Respondent Hydrolevel brought suit against
1. 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
2. "Apparent authority," as used in this Comment, refers to the agency theory under which
a principal may be held liable for the unauthorized acts of its agents. Liability arises when the
principal, through its manifestations, leads a third person to believe that the agent possesses actual
authority. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 comment a (1958) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT]. The Restatement defines apparent authority as "the power to affect the legal rela-
tions of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other,
arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." Id at § 8.
The Restatement further provides that in the case of fraud by an agent with apparent authority the
principal is subject to liability "although he is entirely innocent, has received no benefit from the
transaction, and. . . although the agent acted solely for his own purposes." Id at § 261 comment
a. See also id at § 27 (creation of apparent authority), § 257 (misrepresentations), § 261 (agent's
position enables him to deceive), § 262 (agent acts for his own purposes). For a history and judi-
cial interpretations of apparent authority, see infra notes 22-31 & 35-40 and accompanying text.
See generally W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 8, 92 (1964) (discussing Re-
statement definitions of apparent authority); W. SELL, SELL ON AGENCY §§ 35, 47 (1975) (describ-
ing various factual settings in which apparent authority may arise); Cook, Agency by Estoppel, 5
COLUM. L. REv. 36, 36-39 (1905) (general overview of common-law theory).
3. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
4. 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
5. ASME has over 90,000 members drawn from all fields of mechanical engineering. Vol-
unteers from industry and government serve on committees that respond to public inquiries about
the proper interpretation of ASME codes. These codes, while only advisory, are very influential in
the industry because federal regulations and the laws of most states have incorporated them by
reference. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, American Soe'y of Mechanical
Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982). See Voluntary Industry Standards: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 186-99 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Green, Remarks at the National Board of
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors' 48th General Meeting in Conjunction with the Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Committee of ASME (Apr. 30, 1979), reprinted in 101 MECHANICAL ENG'G 106-09
(1979). For an overview of ASME and other standard-making organizations, see Hearings, supra;
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ASME6 alleging that members of the society had conspired, in viola-
tion of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,7 to discredit a Hydrolevel
product through misuse of ASME's safety standard interpretation pro-
cess.' The district court instructed the jury9 that ASME could be held
liable only if it had ratified its agents' actions or if the agents had acted
with actual authority and in pursuit of ASME's interests.10 The jury,
nevertheless, returned a verdict for Hydrolevel.tt
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 2
concluding that petitioner could be held liable if its agents had acted
within the scope of their apparent authority.'" The United States
D. HEMENWAY, INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCTS STANDARDS (1975); B. SINCLAIR, A
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS: 1880-1980
(1980); Blecher, Product Standards and Certification Programs, 46 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 223 (1980).
For reactions of commentators and the standard setting industry to the Hydrolevel decision, see
infra note 97.
6. Hydrolevel v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, No. 75C1360 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug.
19, 1975), aft'd, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980), ajf'd, 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
7. Section I provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 provides in part: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. Id § 2. For a discussion of the Sherman
Act, see infra notes 16-20.
8. Complaint for Hydrolevel at 20, Hydrolevel v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs,
No. 75C1360 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 19, 1975), aj',, 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980), aq'd, 102 S. Ct.
1935 (1982). Respondent Hydrolevel alleged that officers of a rival manufacturer, acting with
apparent authority of the Society, used their positions as chairmen of an ASME committee to
interpret the code as excluding Respondent's product. See Brief for Petitioner at 2-12, American
Soe'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982) (detailed discussion of
events leading to Hydrolevel lawsuit).
9. The district court rejected Respondent's requested instruction that ASME could be held
liable under the antitrust laws for its agents' conduct if the agents acted with apparent authority.
102 S. Ct. at 1941.
10. For judicial interpretations of actual authority, see infra note 34.
11. 102 S. Ct. at 1941. The district court instructed the jury that
[i]f the officers or agents act on behalf of interests adverse to the corporation or acted for
their own economic benefit or the benefit of another corporation, and this action was not
ratified or adopted by the defendant, their misconduct cannot be considered that of the
corporation with which they are associated.
Id
12. 635 F.2d 118 (1980).
13. Id The issue on appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict based on
the district court's instructions. 1d at 125. The court of appeals concluded that ASME could be
held liable if its agents acted with apparent authority. Therefore, since the district court's charge
was "more favorable to the defendant than the law requires," the court of appeals affirmed. Id at
127.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari,' 4 affirmed, and held: A nonprofit
membership association is civilly liable under the antitrust laws for the
unauthorized anticompetitive activities of its agents acting within the
scope of their apparent authority.15
In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Act in response to concentra-
tions of economic power that were threatening to suppress the competi-
tive market. While the primary purpose of the Sherman Act was to
eliminate anticompetitive activity, 6 Congress included a section pro-
viding for a private cause of action' 7 as a means of affording a remedy
to the victims of antitrust violations,'" and as an additional deterrent 19
14. 452 U.S. 937 (1981).
15. 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
16. See 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890). Senator Sherman, the sponsor of the Sherman Act,
stated that the aim of the antitrust laws was to "check and prevent the great body of illegal combi-
nations .. . that threaten business, property and trade of the people." Id In Apex Hosiery v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), the Supreme Court explained the purpose of the antitrust laws: "The
end sought [by the Sherman Act] was the prevention of restraints to free competition in business
and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control
the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services. ... Id at 493.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Supreme Court explained that the
"vast accumulations of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals... [leads to a fear
that] their power had been and would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public
generally." Id at 50. See also Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 843
(1982) ("long-standing Congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and open compe-
tition"); Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 435 U.S. 308, 314 (1978) ("foremost concern was the
... protection of Americans"); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134, 139 (1968) ("overriding public policy in favor of competition"). See generally 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 401 (1978) (purpose of antitrust laws); Bork, Legislative Intent and
Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW. & ECON. 7, 14-21 (1967) (same); 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 249, 250
n.7 (1982) (same).
17. Sherman Act § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), supersededby Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731
(1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63 Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1914) (Clayton Act extended the remedy under section 7 of the Sherman Act to persons injured
by virtue of any antitrust violation). See also 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) (Senator Sherman's
statement that the private action was designed to remedy the "great wrongs to the people").
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provides in pertinent part: "Any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a resonable attorney's fee." See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 16, at § 33 (b) (general overview of private action); Bork, supra note 16, at 18-21 (purposes of
private action); Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damagesfor Destruction
ofAll or Part of a Business, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1566, 1566 (1967) (overview of the development of
the private action and its effectiveness) [hereinafter cited as Note, Private Treble Damage]; Note,
Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61
YALE LJ. 1010, 1060 (1952) (statistical information) [hereinafter cited as Note, Antitrust
Enforcement],
18. See 21 CONG. REC. 1767-68 (1890) (statement of Senator George that the private action
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and punitive20 measure.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a corporation may be
held liable for treble damages under the Sherman Act for the author-
ized activities of its agents.2' Hydrolevel, however, is the first case in
which the Court has addressed the antitrust liability of a corporation
for the wrongs committed by its agents with apparent authority.22
The doctrine of apparent authority23 originated in English common-
conceived of primarily as a remedy for "[tihe people of the United States as individuals"). In
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that
"the treble-damages provision, which makes awards available only to injured parties, and meas-
ures the awards by a multiple of the injury actually proved, is designed primarily as a remedy."
Id at 485-86 (footnote omitted). See also Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2545 (1982)
("Congress sought. . . to provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations,").
See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 16, at § 331(b) (overview of private action);
Note, Private Treble Damage, supra note 17, at 1566-71 (effectiveness of private action as compen-
satory measure); Note, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 17, at 1043 (same).
19. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). The
Supreme Court emphasized the role of private actions in deterring anticompetitive activity: "The
purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be a constant
threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws." Id See
also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (private suits provide a "significant sup-
plement to the limited resources available . . .[for] ... deterring violations"); Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (purpose of private action is "to deter"). See
generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 16, at § 331(b) (deterrent features of private
treble damages); Note, Private Treble Damage, supra note 17, at 1566-68 (development of private
action as a deterrent device).
20. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 649 (1981) ("[tlhe very
idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish. . . ."). See also Bruces Juices, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947) ("retribution"); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 222
F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.) ("two thirds of the recovery is not remedial and inevitably presupposes a
punitive purpose"), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 150
F.2d 877, 883 (7th Cir. 1945) (treble damages a "penalty"), rev'don othergrounds, 327 U.S. 251
(1946); Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F. Supp. 784, 788 (S.D.N.Y 1936) ("symbol of
punishment"). See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 16, at § 311 (a) (private action
as punitive measure); Note, Private Treble Damage, supra note 17, at 1567 (same).
21. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 395 (1922).
22. Only two circuits have ruled on the issue. Compare Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y
of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that treble damages may be
imposed on a corporate defendant for the acts of its agents with apparent authority, committed
entirely for the agents' benefit), aft'd, 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982) with Truck Drivers Local No. 421 v.
United States, 128 F.2d 227, 236 (8th Cir. 1942) (proof of actual authority required in order to
impose punitive damages on a corporation for the acts of its agents). Other circuits have ad-
dressed the application of apparent authority to the antitrust laws but have not resolved the issue.
See infra note 35.
23. See supra note 2.
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law agency theory.24 Early American cases recognized the doctrine as
a basis for holding a corporation liable for the unauthorized conduct of
its agents. In those cases in which the acts had been committed within
the scope of apparent authority, but purely for the agent's benefit, how-
ever, there was a sharp conflict of authority as to the liability of the
principal.2" One group of cases followed the English rule2 6 that the
principal is never liable under such circumstances.27 Other cases held
that the intent of the agent was not a significant factor.28
In Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Railway,29 decided one year before
the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court adopted the Eng-
lish rule." The Court concluded that an employer could only be held
24. See E. HUFFCUTT, THE LAW OF AGENCY 203 (2d ed. 1907). The basic rule was articu-
lated in Reynell v. Lewis, 153 Eng. Rep. 954, 958-59 (1846):
[Algency may be created by the immediate act of the part, that is by really giving the
authority to the agent,. . . or it may be created by the representation by the defendant to
the plaintiff. . . that such relation exists ...
. . . This representation may be made directly to the plaintiff or made publicly, so that it
may be inferred to have reached him, and may be made by words or by conduct.
Id at 958. See, e.g., Edmunds v. Bushell & Jones, 1 L.R.-Q.B. 97 (1865); Smith v. M'Guire, 157
Eng. Rep. 589 (1858); Freeman v. Cooke, 154 Eng. Rep. 652 (1848); Hatch v. Trayes, 52 Rev. Rep.
482 (1840); Whitehead v. Tuckett, 13 Rev. Rep. 509 (1812); Pickering v. Busk, 13 Rev. Rep. 364
(1812).
25. Essentially, the conflict stemmed from differing views on who should bear the risk for an
agent's dishonesty. Compare McCord v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Minn. 181, 39 N.W. 315
(1880) (principal who places an agent in a position that enables him to deceive bears the risk that
the agent will use his position to the detriment of the principal and innocent third parties) with
National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago R.R., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N.W. 342 (1890) (principal bears
the risk of its agent's dishonesty only when the conduct is authorized or intended to benefit the
principal).
26. In Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, 2 L.R.-Ex. 259 (1866), the leading English case
adopting this view, the court stated that "the master is answerable for every such wrong of the
servant or agent as is committed in the course of the service, and for the master's benefit ....
Id at 265. See also Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, 5 App. Cas. 317 (1880); British Mu-
tual Banking Co. v. Charnwood Forest Ry., 18 Q.B.D. 714 (1887). See generall, E. HUFFCUTr,
supra note 24, at 202 (analysis of the English rule and a compilation of cases).
27. See, e.g., Harris, Irby & Vose v. Allied Compress Co., 6 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1925); American
Sur. Co. v. Pauly, 72 F. 470 (2d Cir. 1896). For a compilation of cases, see E. HUFFCUTr, supra
note 24, at 202-03.
28. The leading American case adopting this view was Bank of Batavia v. New York, L.E. &
W. Ry., 106 N.Y. 195, 12 N.E. 433 (1887), in which the court explained the rationale behind its
holding: "[W]here the principal has clothed his agent with power to do an act.., a third person
dealing with such agent in entire good faith, pursuant to the apparent power, may rely upon the
representation, and the principal is estopped from denying its truth to his prejudice." Id at 199,
12 N.E. at 433-34. See generally E. HUFFCU-rT, supra note 24, at 206 (analysis of American rule
and compilation of cases).
29. 130 U.S. 416 (1889).
30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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liable for the fraudulent misrepresentations of its employee if the em-
ployer derived a benefit from the agent's fraud.3'
The Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to address the ap-
plicability of the apparent authority theory to the antitrust laws until
1922. In United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. ,32 a
case involving an unauthorized strike by a local union, the issue con-
cerned the liability of the international union for the anticompetitive
activities of the local.33 The Court did not reach the apparent authority
issue, but viewed the case as involving only a question of actual author-
ity.34 The Court noted that the constitutions of both the local and in-
31. 130 U.S. at 425. Friedlander involved the fraudulent conduct of an employee of a rail-
road company. The agent acted for his own benefit, and the employer was unaware of the con-
duct. The Court in Friedlander refused to hold the railroad liable, stating that "[t]he company,
which derived and could derive no benefit from the unauthorized and fraudulent act, cannot be
made responsible." Id
In Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893), the Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in holding that agency theory could not be invoked to impose punitive damages on a
principal in the absence of the principal's participation, approval, or ratification, unless the princi-
pal derived a benefit from the agent's acts. Id at 107. For examples of recent judicial interpreta-
tions of Lake Shore, see Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Scurlock Oil Co., 447 F.2d 997, 1004-05 (5th Cir.
1971) (no liability under apparent authority theory when there are "punitive consequences");
Asphault-Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 1967) (corporation cannot
be held liable for civil remedy that is designed to "punish and deter"); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962) (corporation may be prosecuted under "Hot Oil Act" only
if its agent acted to benefit the corporation). But see Kelite Prods., Inc. v. Binzel, 224 F.2d 131,
144 (5th Cir. 1955) (punitive damages may be assessed against a corporation "regardless of actual
authority or ratification"); Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 143 Okla. 196, 200, 288 P. 309, 313 (1930)
(corporation liable for punitive damages for acts of agents because "legal malice of the servant is
the legal malice of the corporation"). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (4th ed.
1971) (general discussion and compilation of cases).
32. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
33. The strike was declared by the president of the local union without the authorization of
the International Board. When striking members of the local destroyed valuable mining proper-
ties belonging to the Coronado Coal Company, the company brought suit against the Interna-
tional Union alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 259
U.S. at 349-50. For the text of § I of the Sherman Act, see supra note 7.
34. 259 U.S. at 395. In cases of "actual authority," the emphasis is on the manisfestations of
the principal to the agent rather than to third parties, as in cases of apparent authority. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at §§ 7, 236. The Restatement defines actual authority as "the power
of the agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the
principal's manifestations of consent to him." Id at § 7. The Restatement further provides that
consent may be either "express" or "implied" from the conduct of the principal. Id at § 7 com-
ment c. In addition, an agent's conduct is within his "actual authority" if it is "sufficiently simi-
lar" to authorized activities. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481,493 (1909). See United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d
Cir. 1947); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943); Berry-
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ternational unions expressly forbade strikes without the sanction of the
International Board. These provisions, the Court said, constituted a
"specific stipulation" that the local assumed all responsibility for unau-
thorized strikes.35
Seven years later, the apparent authority issue again came before the
Court in Gleason v. SeaboardAir Line Railway,36 a case involving com-
mon-law fraud. Overruling Friedlander,37 the Court held that the lia-
hill v. Ellett, 64 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1933); Coblentz v. Riskin, 74 Nev. 53, 322 P.2d 905 (1958);
MeDorman v. Goodell, 69 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Weil McClain Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 217 Wis. 126, 258 N.W. 175 (1935). See generally 10 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONs 492 (1970) (general discussion of actual authority); W.
SEAVEY,supra note 2, at § 8 (discussion ofjudicial interpretations of actual authority and compila-
tion of cases).
35. 259 U.S. at 395. The Court stated: "Here is not a question of contract or of holding out
an appearance of actual authority on which some third person acts. It is a mere question of actual
agency which the constitutions of the two bodies settle conclusively." Id See Truck Drivers
Local No, 421 v. United States, 128 F.2d 227, 235 (8th Cir. 1942) (analyzing the Court's opinion in
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922)).
The case came before the Court on retrial three years later. See Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295 (1925). The Court reaffirmed its earlier position, again with-
out clearly addressing the applicability of apparent authority theory to the antitrust laws. The
Court stressed that "it must be clearly shown in order to impose such a liability on an association
of 450,000 men that what was done was done by their agents in accordance with their fundamental
agreement of association." Id at 305.
Only one circuit other than the Second Circuit has ruled on the applicability of apparent au-
thority theory to the antitrust laws, relying on the Coronado decisions. See Truck Drivers Local
No. 421 v. United States, 128 F.2d 227, 235 (8th Cir. 1942) (to hold a principal liable "actual and
authorized agency was necessary; mere apparent agency would not be sufficient"). But see Mile
Branch Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 266 F.2d 919, 921-22 (1959) (stating that the
Coronado cases did not address the issue of apparent authority). Other courts have approved the
apparent authority theory as a basis for antitrust liability, but have done so on the basis of evi-
dence that the agent acted for the principal's benefit. See United States v. Cadillac Overall Sup-
ply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir.) (apparent authority allowed as basis for corporation's
liability where agents acted with "purpose of benefiting the corporation"), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
903 (1978); United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (approving jury
instruction that principal can be held liable under apparent authority theory when the agent acted
"in the corporation's behalf"), cert. deniedsub non. Western Int'l Hotels v. United States, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973); United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 205
(3d Cir. 1970) (approving jury instruction that principal is liable under apparent authority theory
when agent acted "on behalf of the corporation"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Continental
Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 150 (6th Cir. 1960) (stating that corporation is liable,
under apparent authority theory for its agent's violations "which inure to the corporation's bene-
fit"). But see Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824, 830 (D. Md. 1937) (rejecting
apparent authority theory as a basis for antitrust liability where the corporation's agents had "im-
proper personal motives").
36. 278 U.S. 349 (1929).
37. Id at 353. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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bility of a principal for the fraudulent misrepresentations of its agents
is not dependent upon a benefit inuring to the principal.3 1 Since
Gleason, courts have applied its rationale in cases arising under both
the common law39 and federal regulations.4 0 In spite of Gleason, how-
ever, most courts that have addressed the apparent authority issue
under the antitrust laws have based their decisions to some degree on a
finding that the principal benefitted from its agent's conduct.41
The line of cases dealing with apparent authority is not the only rele-
vant strand of precedent involved in American Society of Mechanical
Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp
. 
42 Because ASME is a nonprofit associa-
38. 278 U.S. at 356. The Court emphasized the importance of its decision: "[Flew doctrines
of the law are more firmly established or more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy
than that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own." Id at 356. See generally F.
POLLOCK, TORTS 67-68 (1887); J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 381 (2d ed, 1907).
39. See In re Koeneck & Sons, Inc., 605 F.2d 310, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1979) (fraud); National
Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Coal Producers Ass'n, 604 F.2d 540, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1979) (same);
United States v. Sanchez, 521 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1975) (fraud), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817
(1976); Gilmore v. Constitutional Life Ins. Co. of Am., 502 F.2d 1344, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1974)
(fraud); Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. L.J. Marcotte Ins. Agency, 314 F.2d 470, 476-78 (8th
Cir. 1963) (misrepresentation); Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of Am., 243 F.2d 331, 334 (3d Cir.
1957) (assault); Adams-Mitchel Co. v. Cambridge Distrib. Co., 189 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1951)
(action for contract rescission based on unauthorized representations); Standard Sur. & Casualty
Co. v. Plantsville Nat'l Bank, 158 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1946) (misrepresentation), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 812 (1947). Butsee Ruidoso Racing Ass'n v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 502, 505-06 (10th
Cir. 1973) (civil tax suit requiring that agent act in behalf of the corporation and that the corpora-
tion benefit from the agent's conduct); Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc. v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102, 104
(5th Cir. 1947) (statement made by servant for his own benefit does not subject corporation to
liability for defamation). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 257 (principal liable for
misrepresentations of agent with apparent authority, although agent does not intend to serve the
principal), §§ 261-62 (principal liable for misrepresentation of agent with apparent authority al-
though principal is entirely innocent, has received no benefit, and the agent acted solely for his
own purposes); W. SEAVEY, supra note 2, at § 92 (discussion of Gleason).
40. See Dark v. United States, 641 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1981) (federal tax fraud); Hollo-
way v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976) (securities fraud); Kerb v. Fall River Indus.,
502 F.2d 731, 741 (10th Cir. 1974) (same); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir.
1969) (same); Henderson v. Croom, 403 F. Supp. 668, 670-71 (N.D. Ala, 1975) (same). But see In
re Investor's Funding Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,696, at 98,654
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1980) (no liability under Securities and Exchange Act if agent acts adverse to
principal's interests); Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1949) (Federal Tort
Claims Act requires that agent intend to benefit principal); Moscareli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp, 453,
460-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (under securities laws agent must have purpose to serve master). See
generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at §§ 257, 261, 262; 10 W. FLETCHER, supra note 34,
§ 4886, at 400-01 (rev. ed. 1978) (liability of corporations for acts of agents for fraud and deceit
under federal law).
41. See supra note 35.
42. 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
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tion, it is necessary to examine the treatment of such associations under
the antitrust laws in order to realize the full import of the Hydrolevel
decision.
The Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of the antitrust
laws to nonprofit organizations in Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States,43 a case involving alleged anticompetitive activities by a trade
association." The Court, applying a "rule of reason ' 45 standard, ex-
amined the purpose and effect of the alleged restraint and determined
that the association's practices were reasonable because they actually
improved market conditions.46 In view of this finding, the Court held
that the association had not violated the Sherman Act.4 7
43. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
44. The practice in question was a "call" rule adopted by the Board. The "call" was a session
at the end of each trading day at which members set the next day's prices. The "call" rule forbade
members from purchasing commodities overnight at any price other than that set by the Board.
Id at 236-37.
45. Id at 238. Essentially, the rule of reason requires that all the facts in a particular case be
weighed to determine the actual anticompetitive effect. As Justice Brandeis explained: "Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. . . .The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competi-
tion or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. Justice Brandeis
went on to formulate the appropriate test:
[A] Court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the re-
straint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil be-
lieved to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178-80 (1911); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). For discussions of the rule of reason standard, see R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 330, 341-47, 356 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 175-82 (1977); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept. Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 783-84 (1965); Raymond, The Standard Oil and Tobacco
Cases, 25 HARv. L. REv. 31, 37 (1911).
46. 246 U.S. at 240-41. The Court found that smaller companies, which did not have the
resources to trade on a 24-hour basis were being edged out of the market by a small group of
powerful warehouse traders. The "call" rule prevented the warehousers from using this advantage
to gain a monopoly of the market. Id
47. Id. at 241. For examples of how courts have applied the antitrust laws to other trade
associations, see Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soe'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549
F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345
F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946);
Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Or. 1966), ajf'd,
399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969). See generally Howe & Badger,
The Antitrust Challenge to Non-Profit Certfication Organizations." Conflicts of Interest and a Practi-
cal Rule of Reason Approach to Certification Programs as Industry-Wide Builders of ComFetition
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Chicago Board of Trade4 established that nonprofit associations are
subject to the antitrust laws.49 In addition, the decision suggested that
in the case of nonprofit associations, restraints of trade are often merely
incidental to legitimate economic goals and, as such, should be viewed
differently from the activities of profit-making organizations.50
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the unique status of nonprofit as-
sociations in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.' In Apex, members of a
labor union took possession of the Apex Hosiery plant during a strike
and refused to dispatch merchandise that was ready for shipment. In
an opinion that suggested the beginning of a trend toward antitrust ex-
emption for nonprofit associations,52 the Court held that the union had
not violated the Sherman Act. 3
andEfficiency, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 357, 360-61, 374 (1982) (tracing the history of the rule of reason
as applied to trade associations).
48. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
49. See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(upholding a Sherman Act complaint against the American Gas Association); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (upholding Sherman Act complaint against nonprofit member-
ship association); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (upholding Sher-
man Act complaint against voluntary medical association).
Although the original Sherman Act contained no exemption for nonprofit organizations, Con-
gress subsequently provided for exemptions in particular areas, See Nonprofit Institutions Act,
ch. 283, 52 Stat. 446 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976)) (amended the Robinson-
Patman Act to exempt supply purchases by nonprofit educational facilities, libraries, churches,
hospitals and charitable institutions from price discrimination attack); McCarran-Furguson Act,
ch. 20 § 2(b), 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976)) (includes certain
nonprofit organizations within the "business of insurance" exemption of the antitrust laws). See
generally Note,Antitrust andNon-Profits, 94 HARV. L. REv. 802, 806 (1981) (discussion of specific
statutory exemptions of nonprofit organizations under antitrust laws).
50. 246 U.S. at 238. Nonprofit organizations do not receive preferential treatment when they
have authorized activities that are deliberately and blatantly anticompetitive. See, e.g., Fashion
Originator's Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (members of guild purposely boy-
cotted and declined to sell products to certain competing retailers); American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (lumber dealer association members exchanged statisti-
cal and price information with "prime purpose" to raise and fix prices).
51. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
52. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.) ("The proscriptions of the Sherman Act were
tailored ... for the business world") (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v, Noerr Mo-
tor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961)), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Jones v. NCAA, 392
F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (antitrust laws "aimed primarily at combinations with commer-
cial objectives").
53. 310 U.S. at 513. The Court explained that its holding was consistent with congressional
intent: "The end sought [by the Sherman Act] was the prevention of restraints to free competition
in business and commercial transactions. ... Id at 493. See also 21 CONo. REC. 2562 (1890).
Senator Sherman explained the reach of his proposed antitrust bill: "The bill does not interfere in
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Two recent decisions, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar5 4 and National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,55 lend uncertainty to
the question of the scope of the antitrust liability of nonprofit organiza-
tions under the antitrust laws. In Goldfarb,56 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for a unanimous court, rejected the state bar association's argu-
ment that competition is "inconsistent with the practice of professions"
because there is no goal to enhance profits.57 The Chief Justice ac-
knowledged that public service and other noneconomic goals distin-
guish professional associations from businesses concerned with the
maximization of profits, but held that these goals do not insulate the
bar association from the reach of the Sherman Act.5 8
In National Society of Professional Engineers,59 the Supreme Court
further blurred the distinction between nonprofit organizations and
businesses. The case involved a ban on competitive bidding by engi-
neers. The Society argued that the practice promoted public safety be-
cause competitive bidding often produces inferior products and
workmanship.' The Court rejected this argument and held that, in
applying the rule of reason standard, it could consider only the effect
the slightest degree with voluntary associations.. . .They are not business combinations. They
do not deal with contracts, agreements, etc. They have no connection with them." Id
54. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
55. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
56. Goldfarb involved fee control activities by a state bar association. In a commercial setting
fee control is considered to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Other per se violations
include horizontal price fixing, vertical price maintenance, group boycotts, tying arrangements,
and horizontal market division. For a discussion of each violation and a compilation of cases, see
E. KINTER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 8.3 (1980); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 45, at §§ 67, 70-72,
84-85.
57. 421 U.S. at 786-87.
58. Id at 787. In a footnote, however, the Chief Justice stressed that nonprofit organizations
should still be treated differently from commercial enterprises:
It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which
originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the profes-
sions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view
on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id at 788 n.17. The Goldfarb decision has caused much concern among commentators. See Note,
The Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations after Goldfarb. Refarmulating the Learned Pro-
fessions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1051; Note, The Professions and
Noncommercial Purfposes. Applicability ofPer Se Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 387, 393-94 (1978); Comment, The End ofFee Schedules: The Sherman Act Applies to Law-
yersAlso, 30 U. MiAMI L. REv. 464, 474-75 (1976).
59. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
60. Id at 685, 687.
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on competition.6'
In American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp. ,62
the Supreme Court finally had occasion to clarify the extent to which
agency theory applies to nonprofit organizations in the context of the
antitrust laws. By a six-to-three vote63 the Court held that a nonprofit
standard-making association may be held liable for treble damages for
violations of the Sherman Act by its agents acting with apparent au-
thority, even when those agents acted in furtherance of their personal
interests.64
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, began his analysis with
an examination of the apparent authority doctrine.6  After considering
both the Restatement (Second) of Agency66 and several decisions of the
federal courts,67 he concluded that, in torts analogous to the antitrust
violations alleged in Hydrolevel, a principal may be held liable for the
unauthorized conduct of its agents, even when the agents act solely for
their own benefit.68 Justice Blackmun argued that such a rule, which
emphasizes the protection of the person relying on the apparent author-
ity of the agent, would best serve both ASME and the public who rely
on its codes. 6
9
61. Id at 687-92. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, acknowledged that the Society's
argument was not without merit but, noting that the ban prevented customers from making price
comparisons, stated: "[Tihe purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive
significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the
public interest .... " Id at 692.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with the judgment but expressed concern
over the majority's restriction of the rule of reason as applied to nonprofit organizations. Justice
Blackmun argued that "the decision in Goldfarb. . .properly left to the Court some flexibility in
considering how to apply traditional Sherman Act concepts to professions long consigned to self
regulation," and that it did not leave "enough elbow room for realistic application of the Sherman
Act to professional services." 435 U.S. at 699-701 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
62. 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
63. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
O'Connor, and Stevens joined. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices White
and Rehnquist joined. Chief Justice Burger submitted a separate opinion in which he concurred
with the majority's result but disagreed with its reasoning.
64. Id. at 1948.
65. Id at 1942-43. See supra notes 2 & 24-28 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 2.
67. Justice Blackmun relied heavily on Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U.S. 349
(1929). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. He emphasized that Gleason had been
followed in a "wide variety" of cases. 102 S. Ct. at 1943. For cases following Gleason, see stora
notes 39-40.
68. 102 S. Ct. at 1943.
69. Id at 1942-43. Justice Blackmun emphasized that ASME's system of codes and stan-
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Justice Blackmun then turned to the legislative history of the anti-
trust laws. 0 He concluded that the apparent authority theory is consis-
tent with the congressional intent to encourage competition. 1 Justice
Blackmun argued that the powerful influence of ASME's code
throughout the nation, and the great potential for conflicts of interest
within the Society, could result in a frustration of competition. 2 A rule
which imposes strict liability on organizations such as ASME, he rea-
soned, would encourage them to take steps to prevent abuse by their
agents.' 3
Finally, Justice Blackmun concluded that although treble damages
are intended in part as a punitive measure,'4 they also serve the con-
gressional purpose of deterring future antitrust violations75 and provide
a remedy for the victims of anticompetitive activity.76 Justice Black-
mun argued that the great deterrent and compensatory value of an ap-
parent authority theory of antitrust liability77 would therefore far
outweigh the possible injustices of imposing punitive damages on a
dards could be effective only if third parties could rely upon the statements of its agents, and
stated that business expediency-the desire that third persons should be given reasonable protec-
tion in dealing with agents-would be served by an apparent authority theory. Id. (citing RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 262 comment a).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 1944. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
71. Id at 1944-45. Justice Blackmun argued that when ASME "cloaks its subcommittee offi-
cials with the authority of its reputation, ASME permits those agents to affect the destinies of
businesses and thus gives them the power to frustrate competition in the marketplace." Id at
1944.
72. Id at 1944-45. Justice Blackmun quoted from H.R. REP. No. 1981, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
75 (1968). See Hearings, supra note 5 (Congress had determined that "so-called voluntary stan-
dards. . . may result in economic prosperity or economic failure, for a number of businesses of
all sizes throughout the country").
73. 102 S. Ct. at 1945. Justice Blackmun reasoned that "pressure [will be] brought on [the
organization] to see to it that [its] agents abide by the law." Id (citing United States v. A & P
Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958)). See also 102 S. Ct. at 1946 n.13, 1947 n.15 (Justice
Blackmun pointed out that ASME had already instituted new procedures specifically in response
to this suit).
74. Id at 1947. See supra note 20.
75. 102 S. Ct. at 1947. The Court cited Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308
(1978), and Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), as ample
authority for the proposition that the principal purpose of the antitrust private cause of action is to
deter anticompetitive conduct.
76. See supra note 18.
77. 102 S. Ct. at 1946-47. Relying on Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477 (1977) and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), see supra note 18, the court
concluded that the application of apparent authority to impose treble damages furthered the con-
gressional intent to deter violations and compensate victims. 102 S. Ct. at 1947.
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nonprofit association 78 for the acts of its agents.79
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment but disagreed with
the Court's reasoning.8 0 The Chief Justice stated that the Court should
have affirmed the judgment on the basis of the jury's finding that
ASME had ratified its agent's conduct.8"
Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion,8 2 argued that the majority's
approach was "unprecedented" and would impose a "potentially crip-
pling" burden on nonprofit organizations.8 3 He stated that the appar-
ent authority theory had rarely been relied on in an antitrust case, or in
any case involving punitive damages, and he accused the majority of
"making new law."8" Justice Powell expressed particular concern over
the majority's use of the apparent authority theory to impose liability
on a nonprofit association when the association derived no benefit from
its agent's conduct.8 5
78. Relying on Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961),
and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the Court asserted that nonprofit organi-
zations are subject to the antitrust laws. See supra note 49. Justice Blackmun argued that impos-
ing treble damages on ASME was appropriate because the antitrust violation would not have
taken place without ASME's codes and its methods of administering them. 102 S. Ct. at 1947-48.
In addition, Justice Blackmun dismissed United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U.S. 344 (1922) and Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295 (1925),
relied on by Petitioners, see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text, stating that the Coronado
decisions did not address the apparent authority issue. 102 S. Ct. at 1946 n.12.
79. 102 S. Ct. at 1947. The majority argued that the Court departed from the trend of late
nineteenth century decisions when it issued Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101
(1893), and that a "majority of courts" have held corporations liable for punitive damages for the
unauthorized acts of their agents. 102 S. Ct. at 1947 n.14. See supra note 31.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 1948 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
81. Id at 1948-49. See supra note 11.
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1949 (Powell, J., dissenting).
83. Id Justice Powell wrote of the majority opinion: "[S]uch an expansive rule of strict
liability, at least as applied to nonprofit organizations, is inconsistent with the weight of precedent
and the intent of Congress, unsupported by the rules of agency law ... and irrelevant to the
achievement of the goals of the antitrust laws." Id at 1949.
84. Id at 1950. Justice Powell viewed United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co.,
259 U.S. 344 (1921), and Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295
(1925), see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text, as rejecting the application of apparent'
authority theory to the antitrust laws. 102 S. Ct. at 1950. Justice Powell cited a number of circuit
court cases in support of his conclusion. Id at 1950 n.6. Cases cited by Justice Powell include
Truck Drivers Local No. 421 v. United States, 128 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1942), and United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. deniedsub nom Western Int'l Hotels v.
United States, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), see supra note 35.
85. 102 S. Ct. at 1953-54. Justice Powell relied heavily on Lake Shore & M.S.R R. v Prentice,
see supra note 31, in support of his conclusion that apparent authority is inappropriate in a case
involving punitive damages. 102 S. Ct. at 1951, 1954.
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Justice Powell also criticized the majority's decision as being directly
contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the antitrust laws.8 6 He
argued that while nonprofit associations are not exempt from liability, 7
the Court has recognized that the antitrust laws are not applied to these
associations in the same way that they are applied to profit-making or-
ganizations.8 In addition, Justice Powell argued that at the time Con-
gress passed the Sherman Act traditional agency law rejected the
apparent authority theory when the principal derived no benefit from
its agent's conduct.89
Finally, Justice Powell expressed concern that the majority's applica-
tion of the "expansive" agency theory to nonprofit associations would
lead to "serious injustices" and "overdeterrence."90 He argued that
nonprofit organizations provide a valuable public service to consum-
ers.91 Because it would be virtually impossible for an organization like
ASME to protect itself from liability,92 the majority's standard could
jeopardize the effectiveness, if not the very existence, of all public serv-
ice organizations.9 3
The decision in Hydrolevel is an example of a case in which the
Supreme Court, while intelligently deciding the case before it, set a po-
tentially dangerous precedent by failing to delineate the outer bounda-
ries of its holding. On the facts of this particular case the Court's
analysis is sound and produces a just result.94 The blanket imposition
of liability on nonprofit associations for all unauthorized activities of
86. 102 S. Ct. at 1952. Justice Powell pointed to the Supreme Court's opinion in Apex Ho-
siery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), see supra notes 51-53, and the remarks of Senator Sherman
during passage of the Sherman Act, see supra note 53, as evidence that the antitrust laws are
aimed at commercial enterprises and not nonprofit organizations. 102 S. Ct. at 1952.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 1949. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
88. 102 S. Ct. at 1949. Justice Powell cited Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788
n.17 (1975), in support of his conclusion. 102 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
89. 102 S. Ct. at 1953-54. Justice Powell relied on Friedlander v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 130 U.S.
416 (1889). See supra note 31.
90. 102 S. Ct. at 1956.
91. Id at 1957.
92. Id. at 1956 & n.19. Justice Powell expressed concern that organizations like ASME
would cease to provide services for fear of exposing themselves to antitrust liability. Id at 1956.
For reactions to the Hydrolevel decision by commentators who echo Justice Powell's concerns, see
infra note 97. But see 102 S. Ct. at 1946 n.13 & 1947 n.15; supra note 73.
93. 102 S. Ct. at 1957. Justice Powell summarized his criticism of the majority's decision:
"[lit appears to be so concerned with imposing liability that it puts at risk much of the beneficial
private activity of the voluntary associations of our country." Id
94. This conclusion is supported by the jury's finding that ASME had ratified its agent's
conduct. See supra notes 11 & 81.
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their voluntary members, however, is inconsistent with the law of
agency9" and the antitrust laws,96 and may have a disastrous effect on
the standard-setting industry as well as on other nonprofit
organizations.97
The majority's analysis of the apparent authority doctrine is, for the
most part, well-reasoned. The Court's prior holding in Gleason9" and
subsequent decisions in the lower federal courts9 9 provide ample au-
thority for applying apparent authority theory to hold a corporation
liable for the conduct of its agents who act solely for their own
benefit.) °o
In addition, although the circuits that have addressed the issue of
apparent authority in the context of the antitrust laws have based their
decision in part on the fact that the corporation benefited from its
agent's conduct, °'0 corporate benefit should not be a necessary condi-
tion for antitrust liability."0 2 As Justice Blackmun noted, 03 the imposi-
tion of liability on a corporation for the unauthorized conduct of its
agents, regardless of the agent's motives, would encourage the corpora-
tion to take steps to prevent abuse by its agents, and thus deter future
violations.'°4 In addition, such a rule would better serve the congres-
sional purpose of compensating the victims of antitrust violations,0" by
placing the risk of employee dishonesty on the corporation rather than
on innocent third parties.'0 6
The defect in the Court's analysis is its failure to fully define the
limitations of the apparent authority theory. Apparent authority, by
definition, applies only when the principal has been negligent to some
95. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 92. For reactions of commentators and standard setting associations to
the Hydrolevel decision, see Howe & Badger, supra note 47, at 359, 386; Perspectives: Technical
Societies Tighten Standard Setting, 2 HIGH TECH. Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 91; News Spectra: Standard
Groups Held Liable for Volunteers' Actions PHOTONICS SPECTRA 18 (July 1982); Katch & Da-
vidow, '"4SME" Brings Major Problemsfor Nonprofit Groups, Legal Times, May 31, 1982, at 13,
col. I.
98. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
100. Id See supra note 4.
101. See supra note 35.
102. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
103. 102 S. Ct. 1935, 1946 (1982).
104. Id
105. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
106. This result would also be consistent with the view of the Restatement. See supra note 2.
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extent, either through its manifestations to third parties that the agent
has actual authority, 7 or by placing the agent in a position in which
he is able to deceive.108
Because the Court failed to delineate the outer boundaries of its
holding,10 9 the opinion can be read to suggest that a principal is strictly
liable for all unauthorized acts of its agents, regardless of steps taken by
the principal to prevent abuse." Such a holding has questionable de-
terrent value because no action taken by a principal to prevent illegal
conduct by its agents will completely insulate the principal from liabil-
ity.' The Court would have been wiser to impose a standard under
which a principal could avoid antitrust liability upon a showing that it
used all reasonable means to prevent abuse. The use of a "reasonable-
ness" standard would also serve the congressional purposes of deter-
rence 1 2 and compensation of victims." 3  More importantly, the rule
would limit the imposition of treble damages to those cases in which
the principal was to some extent at fault, thus more effectively serving
the punitive purposes of the antitrust laws." 4
The broadness of the Court's holding is particularly unfounded in
the context of nonprofit organizations."15 The legislative history of the
antitrust laws I 6 and subsequent decisions of the Court" 7 demonstrate
that the antitrust laws are aimed primarily at the anticompetitive activi-
ties of commercial enterprises. While nonprofit associations are not ex-
empt from antitrust liability,"' the Court has consistently emphasized
that the antitrust laws need not be applied to nonprofit associations to
the same extent that they are applied to commercial organizations."'
The Court's decision to extend its broad apparent authority standard to
107. See supra note 2.
108. Id See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 261 (liability imposed on principal who
"puts an] ... agent in a position which enables the agent ... to commit a fraud. .
109. 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
110. Id at 1955 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
111. See supra note 92.
112. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
115, See 102 S. Ct. at 1949 (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. See supra notes 16-17.
117. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
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nonprofit associations has effectively eliminated this distinction, 120 and
could lead to disastrous consequences. 12 1 As the dissent noted, fear of
antitrust liability could seriously undermine the effectiveness not only
of standard-setting associations, but of all nonprofit organizations, and
might well deprive the American people of valuable public services. 122
Although it is too early to evaluate the impact of the Hydrolepel deci-
sion on the standard-setting associations and other nonprofit organiza-
tions, the Court, in its zeal to extend the apparent authority doctrine,
may well be risking the welfare of the very public it seeks to protect.' 23
KO.B.
120. Justice Blackmun's holding is particularly surprising in light of his concurring opinion in
National Society of Professional Engineers. See supra note 61.
121. See supra note 92-93.
122. See 102 S. Ct. at 1956-57 (Powell, J., dissenting).
123. Id
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